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STATEMENT OF THE C~SE 
Nature of the Case 
Arnold Dean Anderson appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. 
He asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 
obtained in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures, protected by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. After being found guilty by a jury of felony possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, as well as a persistent violator enhancement, 
Mr. Anderson was sentenced to ten years, with three years fixed. 
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress the fruits of an unlawful search of his vehicle. Mr. Anderson asserts that the 
totality of the circumstances known to the Officer at the time he searched the vehicle did 
not yield probable cause because there was no reasonable likelihood that evidence of 
further criminality would be found. Thus, the State failed to show a valid justification for 
the warrantless search of the interior of Mr. Anderson's vehicle. Furthermore, 
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case, and that the 
district court erred in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional information 
submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately nine o'clock in the evening on January 6, 2013, Officer Joel 
Woodward saw a car parked at an odd angle, with the front of the vehicle up on the 
sidewalk. (2/11/13 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.7, L. 11.) Officer Woodward drove around the block 
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and came back to determine if the vehicle had been in an accident. (2/11 /13 Tr., p. 7, 
Ls.11-16.) As he came back by the place where the vehicle had been parked, the 
vehicle was moving and was now driving ahead of him. (2/11/13 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 14-19.) 
Officer Woodward followed the vehicle as it circled the block, and he pulled the vehicle 
over when the driver failed to signal as it pulled off the road near its original location. 
(2/11/13 Tr., p.7, L:12- p.8, L. 11; 4/30/13 Tr., p.187, L.21 - p.188, L.1.) The driver, 
Arnold Dean Anderson, admitted that he was driving on a suspended license. (2/11/13 
Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L. 15.) Mr. Anderson told the officer that he was trying to sell the 
car and that his passenger was interested in buying the vehicle so he had driven him 
around the block to give him a chance to see the vehicle in operation. (2/11/13 Tr., p.9, 
L..16-p.10, L.1.) 
As Officer Woodward was speaking with Mr. Anderson, he noticed a brown paper 
bag of the type typically used to store alcohol near the center console. (2/11 /13 
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-9; 4/5/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-22.) He asked Mr. Anderson if there was 
alcohol in the bag. (2/11/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13; 4/5/13 Tr., p.10, L.25, p.12, Ls.1-2; 
Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) Mr. Anderson responded affirmatively. 
(2/11/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-14; 4/5/13 Tr., p.11, L.1, p.12, Ls.1-2; Suppression Hearing 
State's Exhibit 1.) Officer Woodward asked Mr. Anderson if the bottle of alcohol was 
open. (4/5/13 Tr., p.11, L.2; Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) Mr. Anderson then 
turned to his passenger to ask if the bottle of alcohol was open, and then he told the 
officer "he said yeah." (4/5/13 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-1 O; Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 
(2:00).) Mr. Anderson took the bottle out of the bag and Officer Woodward observed 
that the bag contained a bottle of whiskey with the cap on, but the seal on the bottle had 
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been broken and <1 portion of the alcohol was missing. (2/11/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.15-22; 
4/5/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12; 4/30/13 Tr., p.178, Ls.18-23.) Officer Woodward removed 
Mr. Anderson from the vehicle and placed him under arrest for driving on a suspended 
license. (2/11/13 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.1 ·1, L. 3.) Mr. Anderson was handcuffed and 
placed in Officer Woodward's police car. (2/1'1/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.2.-3; 4/30/13 Tr., p.179, 
Ls.13-15.) When Officer Woodward was searching Mr. Anderson's vehicle for 
additional open containers, he opened the driver's side door and saw a small plastic 
container sitting on the floorboard between the seat and the door. (2/11 /13 Tr., p.12, 
Ls.1-6, p.11, Ls.9-1 O; Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) The plastic container was 
sitting upright and contained a white residue that tested positive for methamphetamine. 
(2/1·1t13 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-21.) A baggie containing marijuana was also found in H1e center 
console of the vehicle. (2/11/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-23.) Mr. Anderson was charged by 
Information with felony possession of a controlled substance, and with a persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.55-57, 91-94.) 
On March 19, 2013, Mr. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss and/or a motion to 
suppress evidence and a memorandum in support. (R., pp.96-103.) Mr. Anderson 
sought suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search of his 
vehicle. (R., pp.96-103.) A hearing was held on Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress, 
during which the district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript. 1 
(4/5/13 Tr.) 
The district court ultimately denied Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress finding 
that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle for the purpose of finding 
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additional instrumentalities of the crime of open container. (R., pp.118-126.) The 
district court noted that the critical inquiry was whether Officer Woodward had probable 
cause to believe that there were other open containers of alcohol in the vehicle. 
(R., p.121.) The district court held that, "[g]iven that both [occupants] denied ownership 
of the bottle of whiskey that was between them near the console, a reasonable and 
prudent officer would have good reason to believe that there could be other evidence of 
a crime-another open bottle of alcohol-in the car. Moreover, given this inconsistency, 
and further given Anderson's hesitation in answering Woodward's question about drugs, 
a trained officer would have an objective basis to believe there was a 'probability or 
substantial chance' of other crimes, such as drug possession, in the car."2 (R., pp.121-
122.) 
A one day jury trial was held after which the jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of 
possessing a controlled substance. (4/30/13 Tr., p.255, Ls.19-24; R., p.191.) 
Mr. Anderson admitted that he had been convicted of two prior felonies and was thus a 
"persistent violator" pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2514. (4/30/13 Tr., p.259, L.9 - p.260, 
L.5.) 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the transcript of the preliminary hearing at the 
outset of the suppression hearing. (4/5/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.10-15.) 
2 The audio recording included a series of questions Officer Woodward asked of 
Mr. Anderson while he was handcuffing him and frisking him prior to placing him in the 
police car. (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) The officer asked Mr. Anderson if 
there was anything illegal in the vehicle, and Mr. Anderson responded no. (Suppression 
Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11:13-11:14).) Officer Woodward then said, "[t]ook you a 
while to respond." (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :14).) This exchange was 
not identified by either party in the preliminary hearing or the suppression hearing as 
information contributing to the officer's decision to search the vehicle. The district court 
apparently learned of this exchange only after reviewing the audio recording sometime 
after the suppression hearing. 
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The district court sentenced Mr. Anderson to a unified sentence of ten years, with 
three years fixed. (R., pp.235-246.) A Judgment of Conviction was entered on 
November 26, 2013 and an Amended Judgment of Conviction was entered on 
November 27, 2013. (R., pp.235-246.) On December 3, 2013, Mr. Anderson filed a 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.247-251, 257-262.) 
On March 17, 2014, Mr. Anderson filed a timely pro se Rule 35 motion asking the 
district court to reconsider the sentence it imposed. (On ICR 35 Motion Correction or 
Reduction of Sentence, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) 
On April 9, 2013, the district court issued a written order denying Mr. Anderson's I.C.R. 
35 motion without a hearing. (Order Denying Defendant's ICR 35 Motion Without a 
Hearing, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence 
upon Mr. Anderson in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to reduce 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Anderson asserts that Officer Woodward did not have probable cause to 
search his vehicle. As such, Mr. Anderson's right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution3 was violated. Therefore, the 
district court erred in denying Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress. 
8. Relevant Jurisprudence and Standards Of RevieV'{ 
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate 
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a 
few narrowly drawn exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 
( 1971 ). One such exception is the so-called "automobile exception" wherein officers 
may search a vehicle, or the contents thereof, if probable cause exists to believe that 
3 The attorney who presented and argued Mr. Anderson's suppression motion made a 
general argument under both the Idaho and the United States Constitutions, but did not 
assert that the Idaho Constitution provides different or increased protection. (R., p.100.) 
Therefore, Mr. Anderson will rely upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal. 
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the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991 ); State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894, 898 (1991 ). The state may overcome this presumption by demonstrating 
that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Weaver, 
127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). The probable cause necessary to justify a search of an 
automobile is the same probable cause that is necessary to convince a magistrate to 
issue a search warrant, that is: facts available to the officer at the time of the search 
would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that area or items to be 
searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 823 (1982); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Probable cause does 
not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but only the probability or substantial 
chance of such activity. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243, n.13 (1983); State v. 
Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 600 (Ct. App. 2010). "Probable cause for a search is a 
flexible, common-sense standard-a practical, non-technical probability that incriminating 
evidence is present[.]" State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 182-83 (2005). 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress As 
Mr. Anderson's Purportedly Slow Response Was Insufficient To Establish 
Probable Cause To Search The Vehicle 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Anderson's Motion to Suppress. 
Mr. Anderson contends that the district court erred in finding that Officer Woodward had 
reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Anderson's vehicle contained evidence of 
drugs based on what the officer believed was a slow response to his question to 
Mr. Anderson, "Is there anything illegal in the vehicle?" (Suppression Hearing State's 
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Exhibit 1 (11 :13)). In ruling on Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress, the district court 
erred when it he!d that the denials of ownership of the alcohol, combined with 
Mr. Anderson's slow response to Officer Woodward's question of whether there were 
drugs in the vehicle, warranted an objective basis to believe there was evidence of other 
crimes, such as drug possession, in the car.4 (R., p:I22.) 
When officers effectuate a traffic stop, the detention of the driver must be based 
on reasonable suspicion and "must also be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 
59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has held it does not necessarily violate 
the Fourth Amendment for an officer to ask unrelated questions about drugs and 
weapons during the course of a lawful traffic stop. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563 
(2005). However, the duration of a traffic stop cannot be extended once the purpose of 
the stop is completed. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 64 7, 650 (Ct. App. 2002). There 
are two exceptions to this rule. One such exception is present if the officer observes 
objective, specific, and particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of 
criminal activity, the purpose of the stop may evolve, allowing the otherwise 
impermissible extended detention and investigation. See, e.g., State v. Brumfield, 136 
Idaho 913, 916 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Further, an officer's explanation for the search is not 
controlling-the lawfulness of the search is to be evaluated by the court, based upon an 
objective assessment of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the 
search. State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596,599 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010). 
4 The State never argued that this exchange contributed to or in any way affected the 
determination of probable cause to search the vehicle. ( See 2/11 /13 Tr.; 4/5/13 Tr.; 
R., pp.106-116.) 
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Particularized suspicion consists of two elements: (1) the assessment must be 
based on a totality of the circumstances, and (2) the assessment must yield a 
particularized suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981); State v. Bordeaux, 148 
Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2009). A mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion on the part of the 
officer is insufficient to trigger this exception. See State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 
(Ct. App. 2009). 
Although the district court found that the denials of ownership of the bottle of 
alcohol, combined with Mr. Anderson's slow response to Officer Woodward's question 
regarding drugs, warranted "an objective basis to believe there was a 'probability or 
substantial chance' of other crimes, such as drug possession, in the car," such a finding 
was unreasonable. (R., p.122.) Simply because the driver is slow to respond to an 
officer's inquiry as to whether there are drugs in the vehicle does not give rise to a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle contains drugs, particularly where the 
vehicle was pulled over for a traffic violation and the only indication of non-driving 
criminal activity dealt with alcohol, not drugs. Here, Officer Woodward had only a hunch 
of criminal activity, which means he could not have had the necessary probable cause 
to search the vehicle. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819-20 (2008) (discussing 
officers' hunches and the impropriety of basing searches thereon). Further, Officer 
Woodward testified that he searched the vehicle for other open containers of alcohol-
he did not testify that Mr. Anderson's slow response to his question about illegal items in 
the car factored into his decision to search the vehicle. (2/11/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-10; 
Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :01 ).) Nor did the officer testify that, in his 
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training and experience, a delay or hesitation in responding to a question makes it likely 
that a person would have contraband in his/her vehicle. ( See 2/11 /13 Tr.; 4/5/13 Tr.) 
An objective assessment of the circumstances with which Officer Woodward was 
confronted at the time of the search did not justify a search of the vehicle. Only two 
facts were relied upon by the district court in evaluating the totality of the circumstances: 
(1) both occupants denied ownership of the previously opened container, and (2) 
Mr. Anderson was slow to respond to the officer's question about drugs. (R., p.122.) 
Because these facts even when combined, do not equate to substantial and competent 
evidence of probable cause to believe a crime involving drugs had been or was about to 
be committed, the district court's conclusion was erroneous. 
Further, it is not possible to reconcile the district court's finding of fact with the 
information contained in the audio recording. The district court mistakenly recalled the 
question asked by Officer Woodward as a question of whether there were drugs in the 
car; however, the question was actually, "Is there anything illegal in your vehicle."5 
(Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :11 )). Thus, the district court's factual finding 
was clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Additionally, it is not possible to reconcile the district court's finding of fact with 
the actual length of time it took for Mr. Anderson to respond to Officer Woodward's 
question because there was no noticeable delay. Mr. Anderson took approximately one 
second to respond to the question. (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :13)). On 
5 In its Memorandum Opinion, the district court recalled the exchange, "Woodward 
asked Anderson if there were drugs in the car. He 'hesitated' and responded 'no."' (R., 
p.119.) The district court also noted that the exchange took place before Officer 
Woodward searched the car. (R., p.119, n.1.) 
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the audio recording, Officer Woodward said, "[t]ook you a while to answer that 
question"; however, this was an exaggeration. (See Suppression Hearing State's 
Exhibit 1 (11:12-11:13)). Thus, the district court's finding that Mr. Anderson delayed in 
responding to the question was erroneous. 
Assuming arguendo, that Mr. Anderson's response was slow, a slow response or 
hesitation in answering does not constitute probable cause or even reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Mr. Anderson's car contained drugs or evidence of a crime. In 
fact, any search pursuant to what Officer Woodward subjectively felt was a slow 
response to his question was based solely on a hunch, which does not qualify as an 
exception to the warrant requirement. For example, under United States v. Wood, 106 
F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997), a defendant's nervousness, even combined with his criminal 
history involving drug use, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Similarly, in 
State v. Henage, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the frisk was illegal because the 
defendant's nervous appearance did not justify the search. 143 Idaho 655, 661-62 
(2007). In fact, such a reaction was likely due to nervousness, which alone cannot give 
rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hall, 978 F.2d 
616 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding nervousness or hesitation when responding to questions 
did not give rise to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Lambert, 46 F .3d 1064 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (holding defendant's nervous demeanor could have created nothing more 
than a "hunch" on the part of the agents). 
Ultimately, Officer Woodward's description of his suspicion reveals had no more 
than a "hunch" that Mr. Anderson's vehicle contained drugs, based solely upon the 
length of time it took Mr. Anderson to respond to a question when Mr. Anderson's 
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response was not dilatory. (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :13-11 :14)) Thus, 
the district court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous and not based on substantial and 
competent evidence. 
D. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress As 
Officer Woodward Did Not Have Probable Cause To Believe That Evidence Of 
Further Criminal Activity VVould Be Found In The Vehicle 
In denying the motion, the district court found persuasive the fact that both of the 
vehicle's occupants denied ownership of the previously opened bottle of whiskey 
located between them. (R., pp.121-122.) Based on this fact, the district court 
concluded that Officer Woodward had reason to beiieve another open bottle of alcohol 
may be found in the car. (R., pp.12'1-122.) However, denial of ownership of one large, 
previously opened, container of alcohol does not equate to a reasonable belief that 
there are multiple open containers of alcohol elsewhere in the vehicle. The district 
court's determination was erroneous. 
The district court found that, "[g]iven that both [occupants] denied ownership of 
the bottle of whiskey that was between them near the console, a reasonable and 
prudent officer would have good reason to believe that there could be other evidence of 
a crime-another open bottle of alcohol-in the car." (R., pp.121-122.) However, such 
a conclusion does not logically follow this fact. Simply because there are two occupants 
in a vehicle and both of them deny ownership of an open container found in a brown 
paper bag between them does not lead to any reason to believe there would be other 
open containers in the vehicle. That is, one open container does not beget additional 
open containers. Further, because the open container was of whiskey, it is even less 
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likely that additional open containers would be found in the vehicle, compared with a 
situation in which several cans of beer were missing from a six pack. 
Merely because there is a previously opened bottle of hard alcohol, in a bag, in 
the front seat between two occupants, does not give rise to an objectively reasonable 
belief that the vehicle contains additional bottles of opened alcohol; thus, Officer 
Woodward's search of the vehicle for additional open containers of alcohol was not 
objectively reasonable. 
E. The District Court Erred In Den in Mr. Anderson's Motion To Su ress 
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Anderson asserts that the search of his vehicle 
was unlawful and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Anderson asserts that the discovery of 
the evidence used against him was the product of his unlawful search and should have 
been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). Therefore, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused 
its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Anderson To A 
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For 
Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance 
Mr. Anderson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
ten years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
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offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 77·1 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v . .Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Anderson does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishmmrt are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
In light of Mr. Anderson's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its 
discretion in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact 
that, with programming, Mr. Anderson could likely be successful in the community. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl),6 p.18.) Notably, the presentencing 
investigator recommended a retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.18.) 
Mr. Anderson has not had an easy life. Mr. Anderson was verbally and 
physically abused by both of his parents. (PSI, p.13.) He left home at age twelve and 
rode trains to different states and worked in fields to provide for himself. (PSI, pp.13, 
18.) 
6 References to the "PSI" shall include the entire electronic file, including all attachments 
such as letters in support, substance abuse evaluations. 
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However, Mr. Anderson values his children and enjoys spending time with his 
grandchildren. (PSI, pp.13-14, 17.) Further, he has the support of members of his 
community. (PSI, p.42.) The fact that Mr. Anderson has strong support from family 
members and friends should have received the attention of the district court. See 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who 
had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts 
that had the district court properly considered his difficult childhood and his dedication to 
his famiiy, it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Declined To Reduce Mr. Anderson's 
Sentence In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35 Motion 
In Mr. Anderson's Rule 35 motion, he asked the district court to correct or reduce 
his sentence. (On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of Sentence, p.1, attached to 
the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) In support of his Rule 35 motion, 
Mr. Anderson submitted several documents regarding his case. 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
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the defondant rnust later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id. "When presenting a Rule 35 
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
In his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Anderson informed the court that the prosecutor's 
statements during the sentencing hearing regarding his failure to comply with an order 
to complete a court compliance program were untrue, as Mr. Anderson was never 
ordered to complete the program. (On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of 
Sentence, p.2, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) 
Mr. Anderson asked the district court to consider the importance of his grandchildren to 
him. (On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of Sentence, p.4, attached to the 
Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) Further, Mr. Anderson advised the district 
court that he was concerned that the apartment complex he had worked hard to 
renovate and clean up would be lost if he were incarcerated for a lengthy period of time. 
(On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of Sentence, pp.3-4, attached to the Motion 
to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) However, the district court denied Mr. Anderson's 
motion without a hearing. (Order Denying Defendant's ICR 35 Motion Without a 
Hearing, pp.1-6, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) 
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court's refusal to reduce his sentence represents 
an abuse of discretion. 
In addition to the new information provided in his Rule 35 motion, the district 
court was aware of other mitigating circumstances, as set forth in Section II. Based on 
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the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at the time 
of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce 
Mr. Anderson's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the district court's judgment of conviction and reverse the order which 
denied his motion to suppress. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence or vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
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